The Trudeau administration hesitated a long time before blocking a Chinese takeover for the first time in 2018. Before Ottawa stepped in, the proposed acquisition of Aecon Group, a sizable Toronto-based construction company, by CCCC International Holding Ltd. had been underway for several months. National security organizations advised against it. Trudeau objected, claiming that the Aecon agreement “threatened Canadian sovereignty.” It was the first agreement with a Chinese connection that his government had blocked since entering office in 2015, and the wording used was both direct and cautious, presented as a particular situation rather than a general position on Chinese investment.
Two years later, in December 2020, Ottawa rejected Shandong Gold Mining’s bid of C$230 million for the Arctic gold mine operator TMAC Resources. Shandong was a state-owned company in China. The mine was located close to Canadian and NATO northern defense facilities in Nunavut, a militarily sensitive area. The purchase was overwhelmingly accepted by TMAC’s shareholders. After reviewing it in accordance with the Investment Canada Act, the government rejected it. According to Shandong’s own statement, the ban was put in place “for the purpose of safeguarding national security.” There was no additional public explanation provided. Although there was a trend, it was still case-by-case.
Important Information
| Field | Details |
|---|---|
| Legal Framework | Investment Canada Act (ICA) — Canada’s primary tool for reviewing foreign investments; amended significantly by Bill C-34 (Royal Assent March 2024, key provisions in force September 2024); requires mandatory notification for all foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses; Minister of Industry can recommend blocking on national security grounds |
| Key ICA Amendment (Bill C-34, 2024) | Introduced interim conditions authority (Minister can impose restrictions during a review); expanded ministerial authority to review any state-owned enterprise investment for “net benefit”; introduced pre-implementation filing requirements for “sensitive sectors”; updated economic security as a standalone factor in national security reviews |
| Sensitive Technology List (February 2025) | Canada published an updated list of 11 sensitive technology areas subject to heightened foreign investment scrutiny — investments involving listed technologies face increased ICA review regardless of deal value |
| Hikvision Wind-Up Order (June 27, 2025) | Governor-in-Council ordered Hikvision Canada Inc. — subsidiary of Chinese surveillance camera maker — to wind up all Canadian operations; the company had failed to file ICA notification when it began operations in 2015; order required cancellation of all sales, termination of employees within 120 days, and cessation of all marketing and support activities |
| TikTok Wind-Up Order (November 6, 2024) | Governor-in-Council ordered TikTok Technology Canada Inc. to wind up its Canadian business; the order applied to the Canadian corporate entity, not to Canadian users’ access to the app |
| Earlier Wind-Ups (2024) | Bluvec Technologies Inc. (anti-drone company) and Pegauni Technology (wireless systems) — both ordered dissolved in May 2024 |
| Aecon Group Block (2018) | Trudeau government blocked proposed acquisition of Toronto-based Aecon Group Inc. by CCCC International Holding Ltd. (China) — first Chinese deal vetoed by the Trudeau government |
| Shandong Gold/TMAC Block (2020) | Trudeau government blocked Shandong Gold Mining (Chinese state-owned) from acquiring TMAC Resources — operator of an Arctic gold mine; Shandong confirmed the block was “for the purpose of safeguarding national security” |
| Winnipeg NML Breach | Two scientists — Xiangguo Qiu and husband Keding Cheng — escorted from Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg in July 2019; fired January 2021; investigators found Qiu posed “a realistic and credible threat to Canada’s economic security”; evidence showed both provided confidential scientific information to Chinese state and military institutions; now working in China under pseudonyms; RCMP investigation ongoing |
The Investment Canada Act itself underwent significant changes between 2020 and 2025. The most important change to the Act since the introduction of national security review powers in 2009 was Bill C-34, which was given Royal Assent in March 2024 and went into effect in September 2024. The Minister of Industry now has more power to place interim limitations on investments while they are being reviewed according to the new law. This means that a transaction may be limited before a final decision is reached. It improved the capacity to examine both company and asset purchases. It closed what critics had long pointed out as a gap that permitted technologically sensitive deals to move forward because they did not match a tight definition of threat by clearly identifying economic security as a national security priority.
Additionally, it created a Sensitive Technology List, which was released in February 2025 and covers eleven disciplines, such as biotechnology, advanced sensors, AI, and quantum computing. Any foreign investment in these fields is immediately subject to increased scrutiny. The real-world effects of these modifications soon became apparent. Two Chinese-affiliated companies, Bluvec Technologies (which produced anti-drone technology) and Pegauni Technology (which worked in wireless systems), were ordered to cease their Canadian operations in May 2024.
TikTok Technology Canada Inc. was ordered to wind up in November 2024. It should be noted that this was an order directed at the Canadian corporate entity rather than a ban on the app for Canadian users. This is a significantly different action in terms of what it suggests about the government’s perception of Chinese corporate presence in Canada. The Canadian subsidiary of a significant Chinese security camera manufacturer, Hikvision Canada Inc., was given a wind-up order in June 2025 that required it to stop all operations, cancel all sales, and fire all Canadian workers and contractors within 120 days. Since the ICA notification period had passed before the review was started, Hikvision is now contesting the order in Federal Court, claiming it was improper.
The Winnipeg laboratory scandal runs concurrently with all of this, influencing the political climate in which these choices are being made. The only Level 4 biosecurity facility in Canada, the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg is built to handle the most dangerous infections. Two scientists, Xiangguo Qiu and her husband Keding Cheng, had been surreptitiously supplying Chinese state and military institutions with sensitive scientific data while employed there, according to documents presented in Parliament in early 2024 after years of the government’s resistance to their release. According to the investigators, Cheng posed “a very serious and credible security danger,” while Qiu constituted “a realistic and credible threat to Canada’s economic security.” They were both sacked in 2021, hauled out of the lab in 2019, and by 2024 were working under false identities in China. The RCMP inquiry is still ongoing. No accusations have been made.
Observing this sequence from the outside gives the impression that the nation is still adjusting to the discrepancy between its perception of and actual level of protection for its research institutions. When combined, the Sensitive Technology List, the modified ICA, and the numerous wind-up orders show a government that has spent years closing doors it was unaware were open.
